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The true, the good, and the 
beautiful in Plato’s Statesman
Evanthia Speliotis
The hallmark and deﬁning criterion of the statesman’s knowledge in 
the Statesman is knowledge of the measure of the mean (to metrion, Pol 
283e).  The mean, in the Statesman’s discussion is what is needed if the 
arts are to produce things that are both good and beautiful (Pol 284b). 
Though it is not named “the good” in the Statesman account, both the 
description of the measure of the mean and the role it plays relative to the 
other knowledges and arts echo Socrates’ description of the good in the 
Republic.  For example, Socrates says of the idea of the good that it is “the 
greatest study, and it is by availing oneself of it along with just things and 
the rest that they become useful and beneﬁcial” (Rep 505a).  And in the 
Statesman, the Stranger says that it is only “by preserving the mean that 
the arts produce everything good and beautiful” (Pol 284b).  Beautiful and 
good actions and productions need the guidance of knowledge.  What 
the nature of this knowledge is and how it must be presented in order 
to guide and effect these beautiful and good actions and productions are 
two of the central questions in the dialogue.  
At ﬁrst glance, the discussion of the measure of the mean appears to 
be a digression.  The chief focus of the Statesman is to deﬁne the statesman 
(ton politikon andra, Pol 257b) as a certain kind of knower (epistêmon).  The 
knowledge of the statesman, however, is knowledge of the measure of 
the mean.  Because of his knowledge of the measure of the mean, the 
statesman is said to be the architectonic ruler over all the sciences and 
arts in the city.  As the measure of the mean must rule all actions if those 
actions are to be truly artful and beneﬁcial, so too statesmanship must 
rule all the arts and sciences in the city if the city is to ﬂourish and excel. 
Statesmanship, therefore, is presented as the paradigmatic instantiation 
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of the measure of the mean.
The suggested conﬂuence of the search for the statesman and the 
measure of the mean raises the question of why Plato chooses to approach 
the measure of the mean through an investigation into the statesman in 
particular.  As we delve into the discussion, it becomes clear that the kind 
of knowledge that statesmanship requires and the kind of the knowledge 
that is the measure of the mean are both a knowledge about species (Pol 
285a-b).  The knowledge of the statesman, however, appears to be only 
a subset of the knowledge of species in general, for the particular object 
of the statesman’s knowledge is human being.  Following from this, the 
practical application and telos of pursuing the knowledge of species in 
general appears to be different from the practical application and telos 
of the statesman’s knowledge of human being.  As the Stranger puts it, 
the purpose for pursuing knowledge of species in general is “to become 
more dialectical about everything” (Pol 285c-d).  And, if one has achieved 
this knowledge for oneself and wishes to put it into practice, the Stranger 
says he must present this knowledge beautifully (Pol 285d-286a), “ﬁtting” 
one’s knowledge to one of the senses of the inquirer, but one must also 
(and ﬁrst) present one’s knowledge in such a way that the inquirer will 
become more capable of dialectic (286d-287a).  The goal of becoming more 
capable of dialectic and making others more capable of it as well seems 
to belong to philosophy, however, not to statesmanship.  The focus of 
statesmanship seems rather to be to actualize the measure of the mean in 
the city: statesmanship must “rule those who have the capacity to act, in 
its cognizance of the beginning and initial impulse of the greatest things 
in cities in regard to timeliness and untimeliness, and all the rest must do 
what is ordered” (Pol 305d).
The Stranger’s procedure in the Statesman is to arrive at the measure 
of the mean through the search for the statesman.  The statesman’s 
knowledge is an example of knowledge of the mean.  By approaching 
the measure of the mean through this particular example, Plato invites 
us to consider what the connection or relation between the general and 
the particular, the knowledge of the mean applied to the individual and 
to the city, might be.
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I. Gnôsis: Dividing correctly by species
The Stranger presents the measure of the mean as one of two species 
of the art of measurement (metretikê):  
 … many of the clever, believing that they are expressing something wise, 
say on occasion that indeed there is an art of measurement about all of the 
things that come-to-be.  And this happens to be the very thing stated now.  
For indeed everything that is artful participates in measure in some manner.  
But because they are not accustomed to examine and divide according to 
species (eidê), they straight off combine into the same, believing them to 
be similar, these things that are so very different.  And again in turn they 
do the opposite of this, not dividing other things by parts.  Rather, they 
should (deon), whenever they ﬁrst perceive the commonality among many 
things, not stand apart before they have seen all the differences amidst this 
commonality, as many as lie in species.  And, on the other hand, whenever 
they see in turn the multiplicity of dissimilarities in some multitude, they 
should not let themselves be discountenanced and stop, before they have 
captured all the family kin within one similarity and comprehended it with 
the being of one genos (Pol 284e-285b).1
The division into kinds that the Stranger has in mind is a division of 
two measures. The measure of the mean looks to “the necessary being of 
becoming” (kata tên tês geneseôs anagkaion ousian, Pol 283d) and determines 
what is ﬁtting, needful, or timely (prepon, deon, kairon, Pol 284e);2 the other 
measure looks to “the community of greatness and smallness relative to 
each other” (tên pros allêla megethous kai smikrotêtous koinônian, Pol 283d). 
The mean is a measure of quality, value (timê), and judgment; the relative 
measure is quantitative.  The mean looks to ends and fulﬁllment; the 
relative measure is descriptive and factual.  To achieve knowledge of the 
measure of the mean one must “examine and divide according to species” 
(Pol 285a).  The problem is that many believe they are dividing by species, 
but are mistaken.
A key aspect to discovering and attaining genuine knowledge—rather 
than a false opinion—about something is “standing in the right place”: 
having the correct perspective.3  In order to attain knowledge of and 
discover the being of the statesman, the Stranger and his interlocutor 
have to discover the proper place to stand to observe the eidos of the 
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statesman.  This is particularly challenging since no human being is born 
wise: all human knowledge is a discovery and, of necessity, begins from 
ignorance.4
The Stranger ﬁrst approaches the statesman from the standpoint of 
pure theory (monon gnôstikê).  Claiming that the true statesman is “more 
at home with the gnostic rather than with the manual and practical art in 
general” (Pol 259c-d), the Stranger ﬁrst identiﬁes the statesman purely as 
a knower (epistêmon).  He describes the “purely theoretical” knowledges 
as “stripped of actions” (monon gnôstikê … psilai tôn praxeôn) and offers 
mathematics (arithmetikê) as paradigmatic of this class (Pol 258d).  Such 
a knower (theoretician), if and when he acts, simply asserts or imposes 
his knowledge on the world.  By contrast, there are the practical sciences, 
which contain their knowledge naturally in their actions (emphuton en tais 
praxesin).  He describes these as “handicrafts that bring into being bodies 
that were not before,” and names carpentry as an example of this class 
(Pol 258e).  Although the Stranger calls both classes “knowledges,” the 
division looks more like a division between sciences and arts.
This initial division, whether we understand it as a division between 
theory and practice, or as a division between the sciences and the arts, 
turns out to be a mistake.  At least when the object of investigation is 
human being, the standpoint of “monon gnôstikê” is mistaken because it 
stands “too far away” from human being to be able to see it clearly or 
correctly.  Human being is a particular kind of being-in-becoming, and it 
is this being-in-becoming that monon gnôstikê is unable to see.  From the 
standpoint of “monon gnôstikê,” human being is a kind of herd animal, and 
the statesman, a kind of herder.  In the myth he constructs to illustrate this 
mistake, the Stranger assigns this view of human being to the age when 
a god rules the universe, which he calls the age of Cronus, an image that 
echoes a passage in the Theaetetus.  There, Socrates, speaking of “those 
whom [Theodorus] calls philosophers” (Theaet 175e, see 173c-e), describes 
them as standing high above the city.  From this standpoint, says Socrates, 
cities look like herds, human beings like a particular kind of herd animal, 
and rulers like divine shepherds (Theaet 174d-e).  Given that “monon 
gnôstikê” is exempliﬁed by mathematics, Plato appears to be suggesting 
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that human being as herd animal and statesman as herder is mathematics’ 
view of human and political things.  Of course the mathematician or pure 
theoretician does not literally stand far away from human being and city. 
Rather, it is the theoretical categories and hypotheses—the measure—
employed by pure theoreticians that serve to place them metaphorically 
at a great distance from the objects of their theorizing.  If one approaches 
beings in the world, including, or perhaps especially, human beings, 
statesmen, and cities, from a theoretical standpoint akin to mathematics, 
which recognizes and measures only “number, lengths, depths, widths, 
and speeds relative to their contraries” (Pol 284e), one may describe these 
beings’ “mutually relative sharing in bigness and smallness” (Pol 283d), 
but one will not be able to recognize “the necessary being of becoming” 
(ibid.).5  As made clear both by the passage from the Theaetetus and by 
the Stranger’s description of the relative measure of more and less in the 
Statesman, it is the perspective and theory that measures by quantities and 
numbers that sees human being as just another herd animal, distinguished 
from the others by footed or not footed, number of feet, horned or 
not horned, living alone or living with others (Pol 261d-267c).  Such a 
perspective cannot account for learning, remembering, or forgetting (Pol 
271e-272a; see also Theaet 188a); it cannot comprehend becoming (Pol 
271a), and it neither recognizes nor looks to the good.6  Regarding the 
search for statesmanship, this means that a purely theoretical perspective 
is not able to recognize what is unique and distinct about political rule. 
In the end, according to the Statesman, it is not the loftiness or pureness 
of the theorizing that makes it true, but whether and how the theory and 
perspective is borne out by and “ﬁts” the reality of the world.  To see the 
real world clearly and correctly, the mathematical and other quantitatively 
based theoretical sciences need the corrective of the measure of the 
mean.7  To understand the inadequacies of one’s theorizing and begin to 
make one’s way toward the measure of the mean, one must bring one’s 
theory “down to earth” and test it against the world.  The corrective and 
touchstone for theory, according to the Stranger, is experience.8
Of course, one must take care not to go too far to the other extreme, 
and get too mired in the constant ﬂow of motion, change, and becoming. 
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In the Theaetetus, this is the view that Plato ascribes particularly to the 
sophists, and even more particularly to Protagoras.  There, beginning 
with the proposal that “knowledge is perception” (Theaet 151e), Socrates 
connects this claim with Protagoras’ “human being is the measure of all 
things.”  This means that “each of us is the measure of the things which 
are and are not”: what appears to each is what is for each and what is 
true for each (Theaet 166d).  What is and how it is, therefore, comes-to-be 
from moment to moment, privately and particularly for each individual. 
In such a world, there is nothing ﬁxed, no being; rather, all is constantly 
becoming (Theaet 157b: “tini aei gignesthai”).  In the Sophist, as the Stranger 
continues the elenchus of this view through his tracking of the sophist, he 
shows how, even in the midst of becoming there must be some being—an 
argument he speciﬁcally mentions twice during the discussion of the 
measure of the mean (Pol 284b-c, 286b).
While being skeptical, or even outright relativist, about knowledge 
and truth, the sophists nevertheless claim as their area of expertise and 
wisdom the good.  Thus, Protagoras denies there are false opinions, but 
speaks instead of sick opiners and claims: “as the doctor effects a change 
by drugs, the sophist effects a change by speeches” (Theaet 162a).9  The 
sophists, who are “wise and good public speakers,” claim to apply their 
speeches wisely and artfully, just as a doctor applies his prescriptions, 
exercising their wisdom and art of persuasion in particular instances 
for particular individuals who are “sick” and inﬂuencing and helping 
change individuals’ perceptions (Theaet 167c).  The name the sophists 
give to their special wisdom is to kairon (the timely), which is one of the 
terms the Stranger assigns to the measure of the mean (Pol 284e).  As the 
Statesman challenges the theoreticians’ understanding of knowledge, so 
too it challenges the sophists’ understanding of the kairon, the ﬁtting, and 
the good.10  
The difﬁculty with the sophists’ position is that they claim to have a 
certain wisdom while denying that there is any truth.  In light of this, the 
“good” is either whatever the sophist presents it as being, created whole 
cloth from his purported wisdom, or it is simply what is in keeping with 
the city’s opinions, as laid down in the laws and customs of that city.11  And 
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yet, as little as the health of body can be dictated by ﬁat or the codiﬁcation 
of opinions in laws or writings (cf. Pol 298a-e), so little can the good and 
advantage of a city.  Just as it is in virtue of his knowledge about health that 
a doctor is able to make sick bodies healthy, so too it would seem that only 
in virtue of his knowledge about the good of human being and city would 
someone be able to make human beings and cities “healthy” and in good 
condition.12  Far from the realm of truth and knowledge and the realm of 
the good being divided, when the object in question is human being and 
the human things, whoever has knowledge, whether it be about health 
or about the good, that individual, because of his knowledge, must be the 
one who is wise and is the measure (see Theaet 179a-b).  
For knowledge of health or of the good to even be possible, however, 
it is necessary that there be some ﬁxed, stable being in the midst of the 
ﬂow of becoming.13  The sophists, standing ﬁrmly in this world, amidst 
the beings in becoming, deny that there is any such being.  But their 
claims regarding sickness and health, good and bad, presuppose just such 
being.  The difﬁculty they have is that, in contradistinction to the pure 
theoreticians, who stand “too far away” from the beings in the world, the 
sophists stand “too close.”  Claiming that all that is, is becoming, steeped in 
the constant ﬂow of becoming, they too fail to see that what they perceive 
is a being that is coming-to-be.  While the theoreticians reduce things too 
much to the same, recognizing only quantitative differences like number 
and size, the sophists cannot see past the differences to underlying kinds. 
For the mathematicians, “living being” is all one kind; for the sophists, 
Athenian, Spartan, Lydian, Phrygian, man, woman, child, slave, all 
are different.  Neither perspective is adequate to see “human being,” a 
being in becoming, which has partially actualized its being, but which 
is still coming-to-be toward the full perfection and completion of which 
it is capable.  To truly and correctly see the genus and species of human 
being, one needs a middle ground: a perspective that can recognize both 
sameness and difference.  Only from this standpoint can one see the being 
in becoming, and understand that the being that one perceives is a being 
that is coming-to-be toward some completion, perfection, and end.    
This “in between” standpoint must be “close enough” to the world 
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to see becoming, but far enough away to be able to notice samenesses, 
species, and being.  It is a middle standpoint, “away from the extremes” 
(Pol 284e).  In response to the mathematicians and others “at the very 
top” (Theaet 173c), on the one hand, and in response to the sophists and 
others who are mired in the city and the constant press of business and 
the practical, on the other, this middle standpoint must recognize the 
coming-into-being of being, and the (partial) being of becoming.
The world of becoming is available to us through experience and the 
senses.  Our claims about the world are articulated in speech (logos).14  Until 
tested and conﬁrmed against experience, this speech is merely an opinion 
and a theory.  Only when we have shown that the logos we formulated 
“ﬁts” the thing of which it is the logos can we be sure that the logos is true 
and that we truly know.15  Since the object of the statesman’s knowledge 
is human being, and since human being is an actual being in the world, 
the way to test any speech or claim about human beings is to compare the 
speech with the actual being, which is available to us through experience. 
To correct the mistake of conceiving of human being as one of many herd 
animals and of the statesman as a herder, the Stranger lays down an image 
of the account of herder/herd beside an image of human life as we know 
it from our own experience (Pol 272b), and calls the entire composition 
a “myth.”  As if to emphasize how completely the presuppositions that 
lead to the view of human being as herd animal miss the “necessary 
being of becoming” of human being, in his myth the Stranger situates the 
human-as-herd-animal in an age where there is no becoming (Pol 271a-c). 
The Stranger appears to exaggerate to make a point: if one understands 
human being purely in terms of physical, quantiﬁable criteria, one fails to 
understand the kind of becoming that is unique to human beings and that 
sets them apart from all other beings.  Therefore, in the myth, only the age 
that portrays “life as we know it” is rooted in becoming.  At the same time, 
the myth reveals the mistake of monon gnôstikê and points the way toward 
the truth the Stranger and his interlocutor are seeking.
The becoming that is manifest in this world has a determinate structure 
and order, both on the level of the whole (kosmos) and for the beings found 
within the kosmos.  Within this world, human beings are born, grow up, 
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learn, develop arts, build cities and families, and die.  Their being or nature 
within this world is a mixture of necessities and possibilities.  Some of 
their characteristics they have in common with all living things; some of 
their characteristics, however, are unique and set them apart as a distinct 
kind of being.  For example, all the beings in the world (plants, animals, 
and humans) participate in bodily becoming: birth, growth, reproduction, 
death, in an ongoing, self-perpetuating cycle.  Human beings, however, 
exhibit another kind of becoming, a non-bodily becoming that is exhibited 
through their capacity for speech, their invention and employment of 
arts, their managing of their own way of life, their establishment of cities, 
and their self-governance.  This non-bodily (soul or mind) becoming and 
capacity (dunamis) is manifest if one looks to experience, to actual human 
beings acting in the world. 
Experience alone, however, while an essential safeguard against 
and touchstone for, theory, is not sufﬁcient.  If one stands too close to 
experience, to immediate, particular, actions, one might understand these 
capacities simply as powers-to-affect or make.16  But this is to fail to think 
abstractly enough.  What is ﬁrst is not human beings making and doing; 
what is ﬁrst is some need and a desire to overcome or fulﬁll that need.17 
It is true that the power (dunamis: capacity) must also be present for the 
arts to be able to develop, but the “beginning impulse” (hormên, Pol 305d) 
is teleological, aimed from the start at an end.  According to the myth, the 
very coming-into-being of the arts is connected with a purpose or end, 
suggesting from the start the importance and necessity of the measure of 
the mean (“the ﬁtting, the timely, the needful”).18  
Reminding us that any claim about the world must be tested against 
the world it purports to explain, correcting lofty theories with a version 
of child’s play (Pol 268d-e), the Stranger’s myth is humbling.  It is also 
revolutionary for readers of Plato, ﬁnding and situating being as it does 
in this world, in nature, and in the beings-in-becoming that inhabit it.  At 
the same time, the myth is only a beginning, not an end (see Pol 268d, 
274e).  The being that is to be found in this world is a being that is more 
in potentiality than actuality.  The myth makes clear what is the correct 
species of human being and statesman: that both human being and 
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statesman are beings in becoming, that this becoming is both bodily and 
non-bodily (soul), and that they by nature have certain needs, as well 
as the capacities to fulﬁll those needs.  The myth, therefore, has helped 
achieve the ﬁrst step necessary for the measure of the mean: it has correctly 
identiﬁed the nature of the statesman’s subjects and, therefore, of the 
statesman’s knowledge.  Ruling over human beings in becoming, with 
certain needs and certain potentials (dunameis), the statesman’s science is 
the knowledge of what will satisfy the needs and complete the potentials. 
The exercise of this knowledge will in turn allow the tools that human 
beings have developed to respond to these needs—namely, speech and 
arts—to fulﬁll their function and achieve the good for which they were 
developed in the ﬁrst place.
II. Praxis and the good
It is because the statesman’s subjects are beings in becoming that 
need guidance if they are to fulﬁll their needs and perfect their capacities 
that the statesman’s job is not complete simply by coming to know; he 
must put his knowledge into action.19  Statesmanship is both a science 
(knowledge) and an art (beautiful praxis).  As a way to understand the 
praxis of statesmanship, the Stranger offers as paradigm the art of weaving, 
especially, the art of weaving robes out of wool (Pol 279a-b).20 
The Stranger introduces the art of weaving by situating it among 
the totality of all the arts, which, applying the lesson of the myth, he 
describes in terms of purpose/end: “of all the things we have that we 
craft or acquire, some are for the sake of affecting (making) something, 
and some are repellents for the sake of not being affected” (Pol 279c).21 
What the ﬁnal weaving will be, and what sort it will be (tightly or loosely 
woven, of ﬂax or of wool, a cloak or a blanket, large or small), depends 
on and is derivative of the purpose to be served, the need to be met.  The 
discussion of weaving illustrates how the purpose for the sake of which 
the artful action is undertaken determines what the ﬁnal product will 
be, how one will proceed, and what materials one will employ (see Pol 
279c-280a, 280b-e).
If we consider weaving independently of a particular purpose or goal, it 
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is simply the action (praxis) of plaiting warp and woof and, for a moment, 
the Stranger suggests that this is all it is (Pol 283a).  This is the perspective 
or standpoint one might have if one were considering the woven product 
purely in itself.  To be sure, for a woven product even to be, there must be 
a plaiting of warp and woof.  The warp threads are the “solid” (stereon) 
threads (Pol 282e).  They provide the strength and the underlying structure 
of the woven garment.  The woof threads are “ﬂuffy” and “soft” (Pol 
282e).  They are the threads that give the weaving some suppleness and 
adaptability.  When the Stranger applies the analogy of weaving to the city, 
he speaks of binding together moderate and courageous characters into 
“the single and whole work of royal weaving” (Pol 310e).  In this “royal 
weaving” the “warp” is the courageous individuals, who are quick, and 
manly, at times stiff (Pol 306e-307c), while the moderate characters, who 
“mind their own business” and seek peace, not war (Pol 307c), constitute 
the “woof.”  To bring the woven robe into being, one must interweave the 
soft, pliable woof with the stiff, rigid warp.  If one tried to bind together 
only warp threads, the elements would not “ﬁt” and the result would be 
a stiff, unyielding mass.  If one combined only woof threads, the product 
would be too soft, without enough “backbone” to stand on its own.  Only 
when the two kinds are interwoven together—whether for a woolen 
robe or for a city—will the whole truly have the kind of structure and 
adaptability that it needs to be called a well woven product.
And yet, if the woven product is produced without reference to or 
guided by an end (the mean), then it will be useless, or possibly even 
harmful.  However beautiful it may look, it will in truth be ugly.22  Thus, 
for example, however beautiful and rich looking a robe spun of silk and 
gold thread might be when considered in itself, if you give it to a ditch 
digger to warm himself on cold nights, it will not only be inadequate 
(hence “not-ﬁtting”), it will actually be an affront, and therefore ugly.  For 
a praxis to be truly beautiful, it must be ruled by and have as its goal and 
guide the good.  Only when one considers the activity of weaving within 
the structure and context of a goal to be achieved (or a need to be met) 
does one realize the complex network of activities of which it is a part, the 
totality and synergy of which constitute a complete art.  The Stranger’s 
The true, the good, and the beautiful in Plato’s Statesman
L&A 2009.1.indd   225 9/9/09   8:50:08 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 226 
presentation of the account (logos) of the art of weaving, therefore, is an 
image of why both the measure of the mean and the relative measure of 
more and less are needed and how they must work together if one is to 
produce anything beautiful and good (Pol 284b).
The statesman’s praxis is to rule and direct all the arts and praxeis in 
the city: having the science or knowledge of the good, politikê must “rule 
those who have the capacity to act, in its cognizance of the beginning 
and initial impulse of the greatest things in cities in regard to timeliness 
and untimeliness, and all the rest must do what is ordered” (305d).  To 
do this, the statesman must articulate his knowledge and commands in 
speech (logos).  But speech too is described by Plato as a weaving.  For 
example, in the Theaetetus, Plato describes the composition of both words 
and speeches as “plaitings” (peplêktai, sumplokên): “just as the things that 
are then composed out of these things [words out of letters] are composed 
by their plaiting, so too the names, once they are plaited together, become 
a speech.  For the plaiting together of names is the being of a speech 
(ousian logou)” (Theaet 202b).  And in the Sophist, having established that 
words name species (eidê), the Stranger says, “it is on account of the 
weaving together (sumplokên) of the species with one another that the 
speech has come-to-be for us” (Soph 259e).23  Given that the statesman, 
properly speaking, rules (through speeches) but does not himself act, 
there is a  double aspect to the statesman’s “weaving”: primarily and 
directly, he weaves a speech; secondarily and less directly, by following 
the prescriptions and commands in his speech, the statesman’s subjects 
bring into being “the royal weaving” (Pol 310e).   As much as the technical 
or productive arts must by guided by the measure of the mean, so too 
must the crafting of the speeches.  But speeches in particular, insofar as 
they are addressed to human beings, must fulﬁll one more criterion.  They 
must not only express what is true and be guided by the good, they must 
also be beautiful for those to whom they are addressed.   
III. A beautiful praxis
Because human beings are the end (telos) of the statesman’s—indeed, of 
the entire city’s—praxeis, because they contain a telos in themselves, having 
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by nature not only certain needs but also certain potentials, when the 
statesman speaks to his subjects, when he issues commands to the artisans, 
and, perhaps most especially, when he directs the “weaving together” of 
courageous and moderate individuals into the whole cloth of the city, he 
must include this in his determination of the best praxis.  The truly correct 
and complete determination of the measure of the timely, the needful, and 
the ﬁtting requires consideration not only of the goal to be achieved, but 
also of the capacities and potentials of the human beings who are both 
tools and ends at each step of the process.  For, whereas inert materials 
like wool are completely under the control of the carder, comber, fuller, 
spinner, and, ﬁnally, weaver (see 282a-e), human beings are neither so 
passive (see Theaet 156a-b, Soph 247a-e) nor so inert.  Though lacking the 
statesman’s perspective and knowledge, they have some capacity for mind, 
art, and self-direction, and therefore some perception and perspective of 
the statesman’s praxis.  Thus the beautiful and good communication of the 
truth about justice must include both an understanding of the need that 
justice fulﬁlls as well as an acknowledgement that the human being to 
whom this understanding is being communicated has some capacity for 
understanding.  Because human beings have mind and therefore have a 
perspective, the statesman must take into account both what is true and 
what will appear beautiful to them.  
In the ideal case—that is, if the statesman’s subjects stood in the same 
“place” as he did and had the same level of understanding, the statesman 
could communicate and represent his knowledge directly or, as the 
Stranger calls it in the Sophist, “eikastically.”  An eikastic speech is a speech 
that is “in conformity with the proportions” of the speaker’s knowledge 
(Soph 235d)—an exact copy, if you will.24  “It is more ﬁtting (prepei) to make 
plain by means of speaking and speech every animal—to those capable of 
following it—than by painting (graphês) and every kind of handicraft,” says 
the Stranger in the Statesman (Pol 277c).  The doctor, speaking eikastically, 
would employ the language of the science of medicine to his patients (see 
Pol 293a-e); the philosopher who speaks eikastically would, “beginning 
from hypothesis, and without images … make its search (methodon) by 
means of forms by themselves, through forms” (Rep 510b). The problem is 
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that the many (human beings), for the most part, lack knowledge about the 
greatest things (species and ends) and therefore do not stand in a beautiful 
position (Soph 236a-b).25  If the doctor cut his patients or purged them 
without explaining what he was doing in layman’s terms, and without 
persuading them that this was necessary and good, the patients might 
well believe that he was harming them (Pol 298a-b).  And, while he might 
be prescribing with a view to what is needful for the patients’ bodies (Pol 
296b-c), he would not be prescribing with a view to their capacities for 
mind.  The problem with patients or citizens believing that they are being 
harmed by the doctor or the statesman is that they might revolt.  Writing in 
the context of democratic Athens, Plato describes this revolt as happening 
through the Assembly (ekklêsian: Pol 298c-e).26  
To give human beings their due and to prescribe in such a way as to 
maximize the possibilities of achieving the good toward which he is aiming 
(i.e., by minimizing the likelihood of a revolt), the statesman must present 
his knowledge and rule “phantastically” (Soph 236b-c).  That is to say, he 
must tailor what he knows (the “original”) to “ﬁt” the standpoint, but also 
the capacities, of his subjects: “… but to all the rest who are incapable [of 
following a speech], to do it through handcrafted works” (Pol 277c).  A 
phantastic speech tells stories, offers examples, in short, uses images.  It 
distorts in order to better convey the truth.  As the Stranger says in the 
Sophist, to introduce the need for phantastics: “should those who mold 
or paint any of the big works give back the simply true proportions of 
the beautiful things (i.e., an eikastic representation), the upper segments 
would appear smaller than they should and the lower bigger, because the 
former are seen by us from far away and the latter near at hand” (Soph 
235e-236a).  Phidias’ statue of Athena, which appears to be the reference 
of the Sophist passage, standing approximately 35 feet tall, would appear 
ugly to a 5 or 6 foot tall human being if the head, torso, and feet faithfully 
copied the dimensions of an actual human being.  To appear beautiful 
and truly convey the beauty beﬁtting a goddess, the head would have 
to be disproportionately large, and the feet, disproportionately small. 
Similarly, in the case of the Parthenon, if the architects had stuck to strict 
geometric lines, the colossal temple would have appeared to sag in the 
The true, the good, and the beautiful in Plato’s Statesman
L&A 2009.1.indd   228 9/9/09   8:50:09 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 229 
middle.  Instead, the Parthenon was built irregularly—with the midpoint 
of the long sides standing several inches higher than the corners—so that it 
would appear geometrically regular, hence beautiful, to the human beings 
observing it.27  Both the myth and the weaving paradigm in the Statesman 
are examples of a phantastic speech.28  The reason the Stranger presents 
the myth is to help young Socrates understand what he was incapable of 
understanding with the more abstract logos that preceded it: namely, that 
herder/herd animal was an essentially mistaken view of the statesman 
and his subjects.29
Of course, it is possible to present something that looks beautiful but is 
in fact insubstantial or even positively harmful: something that is in truth 
“ugly” because of “ammetria” (lack of measure), such as the silk and gold 
robe mentioned above (see Soph 228c).  Key to the Statesman’s argument is 
the insistence that the truly beautiful: what is rather than what merely seems 
beautiful is essentially linked to the good.  The statesman’s “weavings,” 
to be truly beautiful, must be ruled and guided by the right end.  That 
end, as the myth made clear, lies in the needs as well as the capacities of 
human beings themselves.  Good statesmanship, while seeking to fulﬁll the 
needs of human beings (weaving a “cloak” that will serve as an adequate 
defense against nature: Pol 280e) must at the same time recognize that 
human beings have some capacity for understanding and dialectic.  
Statesmanship itself, however, is not responsible for the perfection and 
fulﬁllment of human beings’ capacity for understanding and dialectic. 
This is the ultimate, highest end and fulﬁllment of the human being and 
it belongs properly to philosophy.  The particular focus of statesmanship 
is more immediate and basic: it is to attend to the human need for defense 
(Pol 274b-d, 279c-280e).  Only if human needs are met are human beings 
free to pursue perfection and fulﬁllment.30  At the same time, as the 
statesman is attending to human beings’ needs, he must recognize their 
capacities and potentials—their highest ends—for they dictate both how he 
should rule and what his rule must allow for and make possible.  Thus the 
statesman, having knowledge of the nature of human beings, cognizes “the 
beginning and initial impulse of the greatest things in cities” (Pol 305d), 
rules with these always in view, but does not himself act to achieve all of 
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them.  He sees and supervises the whole, but that means he must leave 
it to others—including philosophers working with individuals on virtue 
and dialectic, as well as generals working with individuals on becoming 
good soldiers—to work speciﬁcally with the constitutive parts of the 
whole.  As the art of weaving must begin with an architectonic plan that is 
guided by the goal to be achieved, which in turn determines the materials 
and preparations that are needed, so too statesmanship must begin with 
an architectonic plan for the city.  This plan must precede the day to 
day business of supervision (over what the Stranger calls the “causes 
and cocauses” of the ﬁnal weaving [Pol 281e]), and serve as its structure 
and guide.  Both the architectonic plan and the day to day supervisory 
prescriptions must be beautiful and good phantastic speeches.
IV. Statesmanship’s beautiful and good phantastikê
The statesman’s architectonic plan and logos is articulated in the 
(constitutional) rule of law.31  If we look at the reasons why this logos 
must be in the form of law and not be offered in the form of particular 
prescriptions, individual by individual, we see how the statesman’s praxis 
reﬂects and instantiates the true, the good, and the beautiful discussed 
above.
Law admittedly is general: it is “for the many and for the most part” 
(Pol 295a).  It is addressed to the many, not to individuals, and it forms 
the outline and guideline for a community as a whole, not for individuals 
one by one.  A community of individuals (i.e., a city) is necessary because 
human beings are not self-sufﬁcient by nature (Rep 369b; Pol 274c-d). 
General prescriptions are necessary because no human being is sufﬁcient 
(hikanos) “to be sitting by each individual throughout his life, ordering 
with precision the suitable (to prosêkon)” (Pol 295a-b).  General, rather 
than precise, prescriptions, however, if beautifully formed (Pol 297c), are 
also good.  Offering as it does a general representation and imitation of 
the statesman’s knowledge (Pol 293e, 295b-c, 297c, 302e), law therefore 
serves as an outline (see Pol 277a-c) for the regime as a whole.  Since this 
outline addresses what is beautiful, just, and good (see Pol 309c), it serves 
as a model and a guide (target) for the statesman’s subjects to follow as 
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they act, a prescription for their character and actions.  Holding human 
beings to the authority of the law is necessary because they lack the 
knowledge of species and of the mean that the statesman has.  Allowing 
human beings the opportunity to consent to the laws that govern them 
(see Pol 276e, 300b), as well as the “space” to apply the law to their own 
actions32 acknowledges and “ﬁts” the capacity human beings have for 
mind and self-rule.
If individuals only developed their capacities to the extent of patterning 
their beliefs about virtue and justice after the law, they would at least 
achieve some facsimile (a true opinion) about these matters.  But in 
recognition of and to truly “ﬁt” the full potential of human beings, the 
law must also allow for investigation, discussion, and learning.  Since 
not even the statesman is fully wise, this last point is especially pressing 
if the city itself is to have any hope of becoming truly excellent.33   The 
statesman, therefore, at least on the architectonic level, must be more like 
a group (gymnastics) trainer than a doctor, contrary to the claim of the 
sophists that we saw above.34
Of course, within the ethos and constitution of the whole community, 
there must be room both for individual attention (e.g., personal trainers) 
and for doctors.  There must also be attention to the present, the actual 
being-in-becoming, the possibilities, and the needs that constitute the 
daily life of the city.  That is why, after crafting the “cloak” of the law 
(architectonic statesmanship), the statesman must address the ever 
changing demands and situations presented daily by nature and the 
world of becoming.  This requires employing the kairon: directing the arts 
as particular situations arise.35   For example, the statesman, knowing 
when war is necessary (good) and feasible (winnable) will command the 
generals to deploy their knowledge about strategy (305a).  If diplomacy 
should be more ﬁtting in a given instance, he might deploy the rhetoricians 
instead of the generals.  On a more day-to-day basis, the statesman might 
command that the production and storage of certain kinds of grain be 
increased, in anticipation of climactic or demographic changes, or he 
might promote the development of certain technologies in response to 
changing times and needs.  Always, however, the “plan” (law) must serve 
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as the guide and rule, unless and until the community is persuaded to 
amend it (Pol 300b).   
Because the statesman’s knowledge and rule encompasses the whole 
cloth of the city, it applies from the literal beginning, the regime structure or 
architectonic plan of the city, through all of the parts and stages—carding, 
combing, fulling—to the ﬁnal weaving together of the warp and woof of 
the city. And this is what it seems the Stranger means when he says that 
the science or knowledge of the good—politikê—must “rule those who have 
the capacity to act, in its cognizance of the beginning and initial impulse 
of the greatest things in cities in regard to timeliness and untimeliness, 
and all the rest must do what is ordered” (305d).
Both on the synoptic level of writing the constitution and on the 
more particular level of overseeing the particular tasks that contribute 
to the whole cloth of the city: from carding, combing, and fulling, to 
the ﬁnal weaving together of the warp and the woof, the statesman 
must remember and apply the true art of phantastics—seeking always 
in his pronouncements, whether written or spoken, to hit the mean by 
combining in the best way possible the true, the good, and the beautiful. 
He must make room for philosophy in the city, 36 both as an end in itself, 
for developing the dialectical capacity of human beings, and because he 
knows that the best “product” can only be made out of good “materials” 
(Pol 308d).  He must allow for exploration and experimentation in the 
arts, for only through those will the arts develop and grow to their full 
potential.  And he must allow within the city and among the citizenry 
discussion about “the biggest things.”  But always, he must be guided 
by the measure of the mean, which is rooted in the nature and potential 
of human beings.  For only by looking to and preserving the mean “can 
[the arts] produce everything good and beautiful” (Pol 284b).
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Notes
1  Cf. Soph 253d-e.
2  Other judgment words, such as what is sufﬁcient (hikanon), advantageous (sumpheron), suitable 
(prosêkon), would also seem to belong to the measure of the mean.  When one starts looking at the 
Platonic corpus, one ﬁnds the language of the measure of the mean in abundance.
3  See Soph 236b: “That which appears to resemble the beautiful because the sighting of it is not from 
a beautiful position …” At ﬁrst, the Stranger seems to suggest that this is merely an apparition 
(phantasma).  By the end of the dialogue, however, even apparitions have some share in being, and 
even the most precise articulation of truth has an apparitional component.
4  See Pol 301d-e: “… there does not come-to-be in cities … a king, like those that naturally grow 
in hives….”  Even those who would be statesmen or kings, therefore, must begin from a “not 
beautiful” position (Soph 236b). 
5     See also Pol 259b-c, where the Stranger ﬁrst promotes the idea that the statesman is deﬁned purely 
by his knowledge and not at all by his action.  Claiming that king, statesman, slavemaster, and 
household manager have essentially the same science (epistêmê), the Stranger says, “The ﬁgure 
of a large household (megalês schêma oikeseôs), or in turn the bulk of a small city (smikras … poleôs 
ongkos)—the pair of them won’t differ at all with regard to rule, will they?” (Pol 259b).  “Schêma,” 
“megalês,” “smikras,” and “ongkos” are all terms employed by mathematics and other arts that look 
to the relative measure of more and less (see Pol 284e).  In light of the later discussion of the two 
measures, Plato may be suggesting that only someone who employs the relative measure would 
make such a claim.
6     See, e.g., Soph 227a-b.  There, the Stranger, talking about the bifurcatory method he has been 
employing, which looks quasi-mathematical, says, “the pursuit (methodos) of these speeches does 
not care any more or less for the art of bath-sponging than for the drinking of drugs, nor whether 
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the puriﬁcation they do beneﬁts us a lot a little.  For the pursuit for the sake of the acquisition of 
mind tries to understand the kinship and the lack of kinship of all arts, and honors all of them on 
an equal basis.”  See also Pol 262a-b, 263d.
7  For a discussion of the two measures, mathematics, and dialectics, see Rodier, 1969: 37-48.  As 
Yvon Lafrance comments, Rodier understands the relative measure to correspond with “vulgar 
mathematics,” which measures things in the world, while the measure of the mean corresponds 
with “philosophical mathematics” (Lafrance’s term) or dialectic, which is concerned with coming-
to-know the Ideas (Lafrance, 1995: 89-101).  Rather, as Lafrance notes, and as this paper is trying 
to show, the measure of the mean is about the coming-to-be of the good in the world and as such 
it is essentially a measure of actions and productions (Lafrance, 96-97).  
8  In the Sophist, the Stranger says of a certain art of speeches that, “by means of speeches, through 
the ears, one is able to enchant the youth who stand at an even greater distance from the truth 
of things, showing them spoken images (eidôla legomena) about all things” (Soph 234c).  This 
enchantment and unquestioning belief is undermined when the youth come closer to and “get 
their hands on” the things in the world (Soph 234d). 
9  See, e.g., Soph 222c-d.
10   For an excellent survey and discussion of the rhetoricians’ and sophists’ understanding and use of 
the kairon, see Sipiora and Baumlin, 2002.
11  As Plato presents Protagoras’ position in the Theaetetus, the sophists’ self-understanding and 
self-presentation emphasizes the latter possibility, namely, that the laws and opinions in each city 
about the just and the beautiful (noble: kalon) are what seems and is just and beautiful for that city, 
“Since no matter what sorts of things these are that are just and beautiful in the opinion of each 
city, these also are for it as long as it holds them to be so” (Theaet 167c).
12  Thus, in the Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates argue that even Protagoras “would scarcely dare assert 
that whatever a city lays down for itself in the belief they’re to its advantage, that it’s as certain as 
can be that these things will be to its advantage” (Theaet 172a-b).  
13   Kenneth Dorter, speaking about the Sophist, says, “we conceive of forms in relation to the realm 
of change.  Forms and changing things are not two radically distinct worlds…. Forms are the 
timeless aspect of changing things, the being of becoming” (Dorter, p. 144).
14  The long ontological argument at the heart of the Sophist (236d-258e) is addressed directly to 
the sophist, who wishes to claim for himself an art of speeches while denying that there is any 
being, a claim that is in line with and follows Plato’s presentation of Protagoras in the Theaetetus.  
Describing speech as a “weaving together of the species with one another” (Soph 259e), the 
Stranger goes on to spell out how, for anyone to speak in any way meaningfully (i.e., to say 
something about something), requires the employment of species, at least in the sense of general 
classes or terms.  
15  See Soph 218b-c.
16  See Theaet 156a-b, together with 167b; cf. Soph 219b-c, Pol 279c.
17  “… human beings were without devices and without arts in those ﬁrst times, because the 
spontaneous nurture had given out.  And they did not yet know how to supply it for themselves 
on account of the fact that no need had previously compelled them” (Pol 274c).
18  Cf. Rep 369b, where Socrates also gives a genetic account, in his case, of the coming-into-being of 
the city.  There, as in the Statesman, the city is said to come-to-be because of some need.
19  See note 7.
20  For a description of how a paradigm helps us take what is known and come to understand what 
is unknown, see Pol 277d-278e.  As the myth showed, paradigms can point out differences as well 
as similarities.
21  At the beginning of the Sophist, the Stranger divides all the arts into making versus acquisition 
(Soph 219a-c).  Here, he speaks of “all the things we have that we craft (dêmiourgein) and acquire,” 
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which, if we recall the beginning of the Sophist, means all the arts.
22  See Soph 228c: “Everything that has a share in motion, once it has set for itself some target and 
tries to hit it, and yet on each impulse strays off the target and misses it—shall we say that it is 
affected by … lack of measure (ammetrias)?”; see also Theaet 172a-b.
23  What it means to call a speech a weaving is a question that deserves a discussion of its own, and 
lies beyond the focus of this paper.  To begin to consider this question, one might look at Soph 
261e-262e.  There, the Stranger describes a speech as “put[ting] a limit on something by weaving 
together the verbs with the names” (Soph 262d).  Picking up on this theme, Heidegger, in his 
Introduction to Metaphysics, has an extensive discussion on speech and the “grammar of being,” in 
which he says that actions (represented by verbs), allow a thing (represented by a noun/name) to 
come-to-presence by “taking a stand” (Heidegger, 2000: [42-54]).
24  In actuality, no speech can truly be eikastic, because speech itself employs symbols that are other 
than the things that speech discusses and seeks to portray.
25  In light of the Statesman’s discussion, one wonders whether, with the image (semblance: eikona) of 
the cave, Plato, in the Republic, is offering a critique of what kind of city might be produced if one 
forgets that the “materials” of the city are human beings (Rep 514a ff.).  At the least, the Statesman 
seems to be arguing that to create a city that reduces human beings either to prisoners in a cave or 
to herd animals is to mistake, essentially and fundamentally, the nature of human being and the 
measure of the mean.  
26  Within a different age and a different context, Homer in the Iliad shows Hera, Athena, and 
Poseidon conspiring behind Zeus’ back to aid the Achaeans after his stern prohibition of this 
action.  Why?  We may surmise it is because Zeus did not bother to explain his thinking or this 
plan, and all the gods could see was the immediate, apparent harm to the Achaeans.  
27  Seth Benardete’s introduction to The Being of the Beautiful was what ﬁrst drew my attention to the 
signiﬁcance of the Stranger’s comment at Soph 235e-236a (Benardete, 1984).
28  The Stranger makes this clear when he likens the myth to a statue: “just as statue makers on 
occasion in their untimely haste dash in more and bigger things than they should … so now we 
too, in the belief that it was ﬁtting to make up for the king great paradigms, raised up an amazing 
bulk of the myth” (Pol 277a-b).  Then, he speaks of how human beings learn: they begin from 
small, short, and easy combinations, discover the truth about them, and then use that knowledge 
to help them understand bigger and more complex things (Pol 277e-278b).  
29  To be sure, the full meaning of a species or abstract idea cannot be captured completely through 
a phantastic tale or image, this can only be done through species and intellect.  But to develop the 
capacity to know species takes time, dialogue, and examination (elenchos).  To even begin on the 
path toward knowledge and developing mind, one (everyone) needs the aid of phantastics: both 
the philosopher, who wishes to help his interlocutor become more dialectical (Pol 285c-287a), and 
the statesman, who wishes to help his subjects become as virtuous as possible (see Pol 308d).
30  Aristotle makes this explicit in Book 1 of his Politics. 
31  There is considerable debate of this point in the literature. See Christopher Gill (Gill, 1995: 292-
305) for a thoughtful defense and discussion of the view that good statesmanship includes what 
he calls “constitutionalism.  
32  A necessity, insofar as the law is general, whereas circumstances are particular and it is not within 
the capacity of any human being to be everywhere, always, commanding the suitable (Pol 295b).
33  I take this to be what the Stranger means when he says, “since there is no king that comes to 
be in the cities, who is of the sort that naturally arises in hives—one who is right from the start 
exceptional in his body and his soul—they must, it seems, once they’ve come together, write up 
writings while they run after the traces of the truest regime” (Pol 301d-e).
34  The particular image the Stranger offers for the legislator is the gymnastics trainer.  In the Sophist, 
gymnastike was the name the Stranger used for helping individuals aim for the correct target in 
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their actions, which he also describes as having the proper measure: “Everything that has a share 
in motion, once it has set for itself some target and tries to hit, and yet with each impulse it strays 
off the target and misses it,” is affected by “lack of measure (ammetrias)” (Soph 228c).  The name 
for this lack of measure is ugliness (Soph 228a).
35  See Lane, 1998: part III, for an excellent discussion of the statesman’s employment of the “kairon.”  
As Lane’s discussion makes clear, the “kairon” combines the universal human good with the 
“framework of temporal ﬂux” (p.146). 
36  Socrates’ trial and death are imminent and form a backdrop for the discussion of the Statesman.
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